Oh damn…my consistency in updating this blog has plummeted to rock bottom. My last blog post was the Greed Syndrome Experiment on June 3, 2024, and I haven’t posted since. Before I reach the one-year mark of radio silence, I’d like to do a quick rundown of my current portfolio holdings, the rationale behind each position, and how the businesses I partially own are performing.

As explained in my previous post, I’m running two separate portfolios within the same brokerage platform. One focuses on long-term holdings that require patience to see returns materialize (some are legacy positions from my university days when I first started investing).

The other account is my greed-syndrome portfolio, where I target minimal risk (e.g., net debt < 0) and high growth (e.g., Y/Y EPS growth of 25%).

The overall performance between the two portfolios is shown below:

Value Portfolio

Past-year: +23.97%

Since Inception: +21.35%

Greed Syndrome Portfolio

Past-year: +134.80%

Since Inception: +375.94%

As you can see, the greed syndrome account has significantly outperformed both the market and my value-oriented portfolio. However, the greed syndrome account only began in May 2023 and has been operating for just over two years—too short a timeframe to validate the sustainability of these profits.

In contrast, the value-oriented portfolio has been running since November 2020 and is now in its fifth year. Five years and a +21% return… that translates to a 3.89% CAGR. I might have been better off lounging around and parking my money in term deposits for the past five years.

The consolidated return over the last five years is +75.35%, which equals an 11.89% CAGR. This sounds more respectable, but the return is largely driven by the extraordinary performance of the greed syndrome account. Still, this demonstrates that you only need to nail one stock to achieve outperformance. Warren Buffett, arguably the greatest investor of all time, has stated that only 12 decisions moved the needle for Berkshire Hathaway.

Yes—I understand he manages approximately $260 billion, and at that scale, it becomes increasingly difficult for a single investment to meaningfully impact fund performance. But you get the point.

Enough about me rationalizing my mediocre performance that lacks a solid investment philosophy. Below is my brief recap of all 12 investment holdings I currently own (as of June 1, 2025).

Value Oriented Portfolio

I purchased BABA in 2022 as the Chinese economy was reeling from the extreme “Zero-COVID” policy and the real estate sector collapse with Evergrande. Jack Ma, the CEO at the time, had also disappeared for three months, creating significant uncertainty. However, given Alibaba’s robust core business and strong free cash flow generation, I bought shares as a contrarian macro-China play.

Analyzing this decision retrospectively, as the third-largest company in the Chinese market, Alibaba’s beta is primarily driven by Chinese market conditions and sentiment rather than underlying business performance. The price surge occurred in March 2025, when shares soared from $70 to $140 following the launch of the DeepSeek AI model, showcasing China’s cost-efficient tech innovation—a catalyst that indirectly benefited Alibaba. This again confirms the stock’s sensitivity to market sentiment.

Examining the underlying fundamentals compared to my other holdings, the valuation and metrics are fairly average:

• FCF Yield: 3.7%
• ROCE (TTM): 10.8%
• EV/EBITDA: 9.60
• Y/Y Revenue growth: +5.17%

While it’s not the worst performer—it’s profitable, maintains a stable balance sheet, and grows steadily—the explosive expansion rate it enjoyed from 2013-2021 has diminished, making the company less compelling.

I plan to exit this position soon and reallocate capital to better opportunities.

Meta Platforms Inc – META (2.9%)

I bought Facebook when they reported their first-ever decline in daily users alongside massive CapEx spending on the Meta Quest franchise. Mark Zuckerberg’s aggressive CapEx deployment created market uncertainty, causing the stock to plummet from $350 to below $90. I entered during the decline at the $170-180 range, recognizing it was trading at a substantial discount to intrinsic value.

The core advertising business remained intact, free cash flow generation was more than adequate to fund the Meta-VR project, and they owned Instagram, WhatsApp, and Facebook—arguably the most addictive products on the planet.

This was a small position, but I’ve held it for nearly three years and I’m up approximately 273% on the original investment.

Current valuation and business performance metrics:

• FCF Yield: +3.1%
• ROCE (TTM): 43.9%
• EV/EBITDA: 18.5
• Y/Y Revenue growth: 21.94%

ROCE is the strongest among all my holdings, making this probably the “best business” in my portfolio. While valuations aren’t as attractive as they once were, there’s something appealing about telling people I own a piece of Instagram equity.

Holding for now.

This was a “Net Cash = Market Cap” setup stemming from their domain business sale. Since then, there’s been drama where directors attempted to buy out the company for peanuts ($3.2M) while distributing residual cash as capital returns to shareholders at 15 cents per share. Fortunately, this proposed sale was rejected by independent directors in November 2024—at least someone in the company maintains rational judgment.

With the fabricated sale proposal vetoed, the key question is what 5GN will do with their cash pile. As of December 2024, they hold $45 million in net cash against a market cap of $41.7 million. If management executes the right acquisition and achieves cash flow positivity, we could still extract significant value.

Then, in December 2024, they began deploying cash to acquire AuCyber, a micro-cap cloud infrastructure company listed on the ASX, through an on-market takeover bid, ultimately securing just under 90%—the threshold for compulsory acquisition of remaining shares.

Estimating 90% acquisition of approximately 147 million shares at $0.135 per share, 5GN deployed roughly $20 million for this business. AuCyber’s cash flow since 2018:

AuCyber Annual Cashflow

They’re acquiring a cash-burning business with no recent profitability. The company holds $3.29 million in net cash with plant and equipment book value of $11.85 million. I’m highly skeptical and unclear why they pursued this acquisition beyond it being an ASX-listed cloud infrastructure company with a low enough market cap to demonstrate to shareholders they’re “actively growing” rather than hoarding cash.

The only positive is that the existing Webcentral business turned profitable in H1 FY2025, earning $6.3 million NPAT. Operating cash flow remains negative, but this is encouraging news for a company with net cash exceeding market cap. However, H2 FY2025 will likely show depleted cash from the AuCyber acquisition (plus ongoing operational outflows), creating an ugly picture.

Looking to exit this position soon.

Tharisa Plc – THS.L  (7.8%)

Tharisa is performing surprisingly well despite repeated delays in their highly anticipated Karo Project. They maintain cash flow positivity and a clean net cash balance sheet position. They’ve also announced a $5 million share buyback program with an EV/EBITDA of 0.79. Karo Project CapEx has been well-managed, and it’s impressive seeing the company generate modest but positive free cash flow while executing this massive project. Maintaining cash flow positivity likely explains the Karo Project delays, but demonstrates prudent capital allocation and management discipline.

Current valuation metrics:

• FCF Yield: 2.3%
• ROCE (TTM): 21.3%
• EV/EBITDA: 0.79
• Y/Y Revenue growth: +3.48%

I believe significant value remains, especially once the Karo project completes and begins metal production.

Holding for now.

iShares 0-3 Month Treasury Bond ETF – SGOV (9.0%)

This is a 0-3 month treasury bill where I park cash within the portfolio to earn interest.

Currently yielding 4-5%, it’s convenient to hold here until I identify attractive investment opportunities.

S4E S.A –  S4E.PL (25.8%)

This is my largest holding across both portfolios. I’ve held since 2023 and enjoyed quite a run. The company remains undervalued in my opinion. Details of this purchase are explained in this post.

Consider this: the company’s market cap is 69 million zloty, they hold 61.32 million in net cash, and generate TTM free cash flow of 21.42 million. How is this company still so cheap?

Current valuation metrics:

• FCF Yield: 30.7%
• ROCE (TTM): 14.2%
• EV/EBITDA: 0.75

I plan to increase this position in coming months.

Greed Syndrome Portfolio

Food Empire Holdings Ltd – F03.SG (2.5%)

Food Empire is a Singapore-listed multinational food and beverage manufacturer and distributor. Their products are sold across 60+ countries, supported by 8 manufacturing facilities in 5 countries. They own instant coffee brands including MacCoffee and CafePHO, with instant coffee being their core revenue driver. Surprisingly, 30% of revenue comes from Russia.

Also noteworthy—this features the most entertaining annual report design I’ve encountered. Their 2024 annual report adopts a Marvel theme. Look at these CEO comments—he’s portrayed as a superhero:

The board of directors listing is even better:

The company demonstrates financial discipline, currently sporting a 1.02B SGD market cap with 65 million in net cash and TTM NPAT of $70 million. With nearly half their revenue from Russia and Ukraine, they’ve faced market sentiment headwinds, but strong fundamentals have driven stock re-rating.

Current valuation metrics:

• FCF Yield: 0.1%
• ROCE: 6.3%
• EV/EBITDA: 8.76

This was more situational—the ROCE isn’t compelling and FCF yield is inadequate for my portfolio standards. With the recent re-rating, I’ll exit this position soon.

Cipher Pharmaceuticals Inc – CPH.TO (2.7%)

I purchased this Canadian pharmaceutical company when it had a ridiculous EV relative to free cash flow generation. My position sizing was unfortunately minimal, but I’ve held on and achieved a 5x return.

In July 2023 when I first bought, it was a $42M market cap generating solid ~$20M annual free cash flow. Free cash flow had been positive for five consecutive years (rare for pharmaceuticals), making it a no-brainer setup. Profits were also growing aggressively at +15% y/y.

Since then, the company has depleted cash reserves and taken on debt to acquire Natroba, a liquid treatment for head lice and hair mites.

They’ve also drawn $40 million long-term debt from their bank facility, eliminating their debt-free status.

I’m beginning to view this company as entering the “too hard” pile. It was predictable when I purchased—generating free cash flow with zero debt. While they had acquisition plans, now that they’ve completed the acquisition, this is no longer a business I can easily understand.

Current valuation metrics:

• FCF Yield: 9.3%
• ROCE: 16.7%
• EV/EBITDA: 24.74

Planning to exit shortly.

This is the stock that truly moved the needle in my Greed Syndrome account. I timed both entry and exit nearly perfectly and strongly suspect I won’t replicate this success anytime soon. Purchased the shares around $0.60 and sold most shares at the peak around $4-5, achieving a 7x return.

I sold most shares during the run based on valuation concerns. This company sells wellness products like skincare and hair growth tablets online. Their Chinese customer base fueled recent growth, and they remain debt-free.

When the stock ran from $0.45 to $5, FCF yield dropped below 2%, prompting me to lock in profits. The business isn’t deteriorating—I simply wanted to secure gains from a relatively young company that hasn’t demonstrated consistent long-term performance.

Current valuation metrics:

• FCF Yield: 10.2%
• ROCE: 27.1%
• EV/EBITDA: 4.02

As shown above, the business remains strong with attractive FCF yield and solid +25% return on capital employed. I’ll definitely consider re-entering when the business proves its consistency.

Holding for now.

Hyfusin Group Holdings Ltd – 8512.HK (11.9%)

This is my most recent acquisition with an incredible balance sheet and high-level consistent cash flow. The company designs, manufactures, and sells various candle products and diffusers, ranging from daily candles to scented varieties. Customers are predominantly UK & US (99% of revenue from these markets).

Just examine these valuation metrics:

• FCF Yield: 10.2%
• ROCE: 27.1%
• EV/EBITDA: (-0.17!)

The EV/EBITDA isn’t negative due to negative EBITDA – the enterprise value is negative!

The company has a $270 million HKD market cap while holding ~$310 million HKD cash. TTM free cash flow is $33.79 million, with five consecutive years of positive cash flow. This means I’m receiving $40 million cash for free while buying an operation that consistently generates $30-40 million annual cash flow.

I’m unsure what I’m missing, but I immediately bought when I discovered this in the Hong Kong market.

Directors own 70% of shares, showing strong incentive alignment, and the company repurchased 16.5% of shares on April 24, 2024, making this investment even more attractive.

Looking to build a larger position soon.

Daphne International Holdings Ltd – 210.HK (14.5%)

Daphne International Holdings owns the “Daphne” apparel brand, engaged in licensing, distribution, and sale of footwear products and accessories in Mainland China. Group revenue derives entirely from Chinese customers.

The key catalyst improving this business was transitioning from asset-heavy fashion retail to “asset-light” brand licensing. They maintain retail operations, but true margins come from licensing fee income:

Additionally, they hold HKD $520.37M cash against a HKD $791.44M market cap, making their EV approximately $270M. They’ve generated HKD $268M FCF over the past two financial years. The company also pays modest dividends—rare for a cash-rich, debt-free business.

The business is growing, generates free cash flow, and carries no debt—perfect for the Greed Syndrome portfolio.

Current valuation metrics:

• FCF Yield: 19.6%
• ROCE: 16.0%
• EV/EBITDA: 5.07

I particularly appreciate that free cash flow conversion (accounting net profit converting to free cash flow) consistently exceeds 100%.

Total Assets over the past 7 years

The graphs above show total assets and cash balance over time. Once they sold plant & equipment and committed to brand licensing, you can see cash balance growing consistently.

I’ll analyze this more closely and plan to build a stronger position.

Sportsfield Co Ltd – 7080.TO (2.3%)

This is my only Japanese holding across both portfolios. Sportsfield Co Ltd has a fascinating business model – they specialize in recruiting support for athletes, including new graduates and mid-career individuals, plus related services like sales support.

They help graduates and mid-career professionals whose background is primarily sports by serving as intermediaries between athletes and hiring companies.

Revenue streams include:

• Recruiting fees
• Event management for graduates
• Corporate event subscription fees

Business performance shows these valuation metrics:

• FCF Yield: 7.3%
• ROCE: 16.0%
• EV/EBITDA: 3.46

Like most Japanese companies, Sportsfield maintains significant cash reserves. They hold 1.79B net cash out of 5.26B market cap with 1.02B EBITDA.

The business has achieved two consecutive years of +20% y/y net profit growth with consistent revenue growth since 2018. It’s a solid, strong business—not as attractive as Daphne or S4E, but worthy of a small position.

I’ll monitor performance for now—holding.

Conclusion

I should conduct these portfolio recaps more frequently. You lose track of actual business performance once holdings exceed 10+ positions. Life interferes with analyzing every quarterly announcement or minor IR updates.

Some portfolio trimming is definitely required, and summarizing everything in these focused paragraphs with only essential information really challenges the status quo.

I’ll commit to writing this blog more regularly to ensure I’m not wasting opportunity cost.

Cheers,

Ritzty